Abstract This article assesses the unilateral effects on prices of a merger in the Portuguese mobile telephony market. We use aggregate quarterly data from 1999 to 2005 and a nested logit model to estimate the price elasticities of demand and the marginal costs of subscription of mobile telephony. Given these estimates, we simulate the effects of the merger. We find that the available mobile telephony subscription products are close substitutes. The merger may cause substantial price increases, even in the presence of large cost efficiencies. On average, prices increase by 7-10% without cost efficiencies, and by about 6-10% with a 10% marginal cost reduction.
tors from three to two, and increase considerably the level of concentration, it raised anti-competitive concerns.
According to the EC Merger Regulation, 1 mergers must be assessed to determine whether they significantly lessen competition, due to the creation or reinforcement of a dominant position. In economic terms, mergers must be assessed to determine whether they enhance the market power of the firms in the market. Horizontal mergers may significantly lessen competition through: (i) unilateral effects, i.e., by eliminating important competitive constraints, or (ii) coordinated effects, i.e., by making anticompetitive coordination between the remaining firms more likely or more effective. This article assesses the unilateral effects on prices of the merger between Tmn and Optimus.
Our analysis uses aggregate quarterly data from 1999 to 2005. We estimate an aggregate nested logit model, based on a linear utility function for mobile telephony subscription, developed by Doganoglu and Grzybowski (2007) . 2 Given the estimates of the price elasticities of demand, and assuming that firms play a static Bertrand game, we estimate the marginal costs. We use the estimates of the price elasticities of demand and the marginal costs to simulate the unilateral effects on prices of the merger. Our results indicate that the merger would lead to significant price increases, even in the presence of substantial cost efficiencies. On average, prices would increase by 7-10% without cost efficiencies, and by 6-10% with a 10% a marginal cost reduction. One firm could increase the price by as much as 13-22%. On average, without marginal cost efficiencies, the consumer surplus would decrease by about 2-4%. We find no evidence of collusion in prices.
There is a growing econometric literature on merger analysis. Nevo (2000) estimated a random coefficients model to study the effects of mergers in the US readyto-eat cereal industry. Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) analyzed the effects of the merger between Volvo and Scania in the EU. Pinkse and Slade (2004) used a distance metric approach to study mergers in the brewing industry. analyzed the effects on broadband access to the Internet of the divestiture, the opposite of a merger, of the Portuguese telecommunications incumbent from the cable television industry. See also Baker and Rubinfeld (1999) and Werden and Froeb (2006) and the references therein.
Regarding the empirical literature on mobile telephony, Rodini et al. (2003) estimated the substitutability of fixed and mobile services for telecommunications access, using data on US households. Okada and Hatta (1999) analyzed jointly the demand for mobile and fixed telephony services using Japanese data. Barros and Cadima (2000) estimated simultaneously diffusion curves for mobile and fixed telephony in Portugal. Doganoglu and Grzybowski (2007) used a nested logit model to estimate the demand for subscription of mobile telephony in Germany. Gagnepain and Pereira (2007) analyzed the impact of the entry of a third firm on the Portuguese mobile telephony market, and showed that it caused the other firms to increase their cost-reducing efforts.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the Portuguese mobile telephony industry. Section 3 presents the econometric model and the data. Section 4 presents the estimation results. Section 5 conducts the analysis of the impact of the merger. Section 6 concludes.
Mobile Telephony in Portugal
In Portugal, the firm associated with the telecommunications incumbent, Tmn, started operations in 1989 with the analog technology C-450. In 1991, the sectorial regulator, ICP-ANACOM, assigned two licenses to operate the digital technology GSM 900. One of the licenses was assigned to Tmn. The other license was assigned to the entrant Vodafone. In 1997, the sectorial regulator assigned three licenses to operate the digital technology GSM 1800. Two licenses were assigned to Tmn and Vodafone. A third license was assigned to the entrant Optimus, which was also granted a license to operate GSM 900. In 2001, the sectorial regulator assigned licences to operate the 3G technology IMT2000/UMTS. Three licenses were assigned to Tmn, Vodafone, and Optimus. Service began in 2001. A fourth license was assigned to the entrant Oniway, which was not granted a license to operate GSM, and never operated.
After its inception in 1989, the Portuguese mobile telephony industry experienced rapid diffusion, analyzed in Pereira and Pernias (2006) and . In 2005, the penetration rate of mobile telephony in Portugal was 108%. 3 After entering the market in 1992, Vodafone gained revenue market share rapidly. During the duopoly period -i.e., from 1992 to 1997 -Tmn and Vodafone shared the market. The entry of Optimus led to an asymmetric split of the market, which suggests that this event had a substantial impact on the industry, analyzed in Gagnepain and Pereira (2007) (Fig. 1) .
In February 2006, the holding company Sonaecom, which owns Optimus, made a hostile takeover bid for the holding company Portugal Telecom, PT, the telecommunications incumbent. The merger of Tmn and Optimus was one of the conditions required by Sonaecom for the transaction to go through. The Portuguese Competition Authority cleared the operation subject to remedies. 4 3 The penetration rate is the number of subscribers per 100 inhabitants. 4 In mobile telecommunications there were six main remedies: First, Sonaecom would have to return to ICP-ANACOM the licenses to use the GSM and the UMTS spectrum of either Tmn or Optimus. Second, Sonaecom would have to develop a wholesale reference offer for mobile virtual network operators. Third, there would be a financial compensation scheme, intended to overcome the price-mediated network externality effects faced by an entrant mobile network operator. Fourth, Sonaecom would limit the differences between the on-net and off-net prices with respect to any entrant, mobile network operator, or mobile virtual network operator. Fifth, Sonaecom would take steps to reduce the customer switching costs in mobile telecommunications. Sixth, Sonaecom would be subject to a price-cap. 
Demand
We assume that all consumers have access to a fixed telephone. Consumers face a two stage decision. In the first stage, they decide whether to continue to use only fixed telephony, or to use also mobile telephony. 5 In the second stage, they decide to which mobile telephony product they subscribe, if they decided to use mobile telephony in the first stage. This is a standard nested logit structure, where one branch is degenerative and involves no further choices. 6 We index the nests with subscript g = 0, 1, where the nest g = 0 represents the choice of only fixed telephony, and the nest g = 1 represents the choice of fixed telephony and mobile telephony. We index the consumers with subscript i, the products with subscript j , and the time periods with subscript t. Denote by U i0t , the utility of the outside option of consumer i at time t. Value U i0t may vary over time, due to, e.g., its dependence on the prices of fixed telephony. There are three mobile telephony products, each associated with one of the three firms currently in the market. The utility derived by consumer i 5 It seems plausible to assume that everyone who needs to telecommunicate has access to fixed telephony at home, at work, or through public telephones. There may be a few individuals who never use fixed telephony because they do not need to telecommunicate. It is unlikely that these individuals are interested in using mobile telephony. Thus, they should be excluded from the mobile telephony market. If the prices of mobile telephony increased substantially, we believe that anybody who wants to telecommunicate would choose fixed telephony. Unfortunately, we lack data for a model in which consumers choose between: (i) fixed telephony, (ii) mobile telephony, (iii) fixed telephony plus mobile telephony, and iv) none of the above. 6 A discrete choice model fits mobile telephony, because consumers usually have one mobile telephone. However, the nested logit model has the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives within the nests. This property may be tested following Hausman and McFadden (1984) . from using fixed telephony together with the mobile telephony product j in period t is given by:
where r j is the stand-alone value of product j , p jt is the price of product j in period t, V t is the expected network benefit function in period t, ξ jt is the unobserved utility of product j in period t, ζ gt is the common value of all products in nest g in period t, σ on [0, 1) is a parameter that measures the correlation of the consumers' preferences within the nest "fixed telephony and mobile telephony", and ij t is an idiosyncratic taste variable. By normalizing with respect to the utility of the outside option, U i0t , the choice between alternatives becomes independent of the determinants of the utility of fixed telephony. The consumers' tastes for products within a nest are correlated. When the consumers' tastes for products within a nest are independent, σ = 0, the nested logit model reduces to the logit model. When σ −→ 1, the alternatives within the nest are perfect substitutes and the post-merger prices do not change. Variable ξ jt is interpreted as the mean value of the consumers' valuations for unobserved product characteristics, such as product quality, and serves as the econometric error term. 7 Variable ζ gt has a distribution dependent on σ , and variable ij t has an extreme value distribution.
The probability that consumer i subscribes to network operator j in period t is equal to the product of the probabilities:
where P it (g = 1) is the probability of choosing nest g = 1 and G 1 is the set of network operators in this nest. Denote by A 1t the value of nest g = 1 in period t (see Anderson and de Palma 1992) , defined by:
where δ jt = r j − αp jt + V t + ξ jt is the mean utility level of product j in period t and
Expression (2) may be written in a closed form as:
Denote by s jt the share of product j in period t; i.e., the number of consumers that choose product j in period t divided by the number of consumers that make subscription decisions in period t. Probability (2) is equivalent to this share; i.e., s jt = P ij t .
The share of mobile telephony is given by s t = N j =1 s jt . Denote by s jt|g=1 , the share of product j of mobile telephony services in period t; i.e., the number of consumers that choose product j in period t divided by the number of consumers that choose to consume mobile telephony in period t. The share of the outside good, -i.e., the number of consumers that choose not to subscribe to mobile telephony divided by the number of consumers that make subscription decisions in period t -is given by Following Berry (1994) , we invert the observed market shares to compute the mean utility levels of each product, and treat them as observed utility levels. Using utility specification (1), we arrive at the following equation:
There are three types of consumers: (i) consumers that just entered the market, (ii) consumers that were previously in the market but are not locked-in to a product, and (iii) consumers that were previously in the market and are locked-in to a product. 8 The two first types of consumers choose to which product they subscribe. The third type of consumers continue to use the product to which they subscribed previously. The utility function (1) represents only consumers whose current choice does not depend on the past; i.e., consumers that just entered the market, or consumers that were previously in the market but have negligible or no switching costs. We lack data on the number of consumers who switch providers over time, and the choices they make. Thus, regarding the third type of consumers we consider two cases: (i) only consumers with contracts are locked-in, and (ii) consumers with contracts and 50% of consumers with pre-paid cards are locked-in. 9 Since about 80% of the Portuguese consumers use pre-paid cards, in the first case, the majority of consumers are not locked-in, and may react to price changes. Denote by Z jt , the number of subscribers of product j in period t, and denote by Z l jt , the number of subscribers of product j in period t who are locked-in. We approximate the number of consumers who choose product j in period t by the difference: y jt = Z jt − Z l jt−1 . Denote by M t , the market size in period t; i.e., the number of consumers who can potentially subscribe to mobile telephony in period t. We assume that M t = 1.08P op t , where 1.08 is the penetration rate of mobile telephony in 2005:4, and P op t is the population of Portugal in period t. Denote by m t , the number of consumers who effectively make subscription decisions in period t. This value is given by m t = M t − N j =1 Z l jt−1 . The share of product j is then given by s jt = y jt m t (Table 1) .
Z jt , the penetration rate of mobile telephony in period t. We assume that due to lags in information transmission, in each period consumers only observe the number of subscribers of the previous period. Thus, the expected network benefits are a function of the penetration rate of the previous period: The Market shares are computed using definition for Model I (only contract consumers are locked-in)
. 10 In addition, we assume that the expected network benefits are a linear function: V (z t−1 ) = βz t−1 . Network effects are an important aspect of mobile telephony. Ignoring them could lead to overestimating the price elasticities of demand. By making network effects depend on the penetration rate -i.e., the total number of subscribers -we assume perfect compatibility between the various mobile telephony products, and the absence of price mediated network effects, due to difference on-net and off-net prices. 11 Using demand equation (3), the substitution matrix for the nested logit model is given by: 
The elements of matrix S t are calculated using the estimates of σ and α. Using (4), for the products within the mobile telephony nest, the elasticity of demand for product j with respect to the price of product k is given by: The elasticity of the market demand for mobile telephony subscription with respect to the lagged penetration rate is given by:
Following Anderson and de Palma (1992) and Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) , the expected net consumer surplus for the nested logit model equals:
Supply
We assume that firms choose prices and play a static Bertrand game. Additionally, we assume that in their profit maximization problems firms take into account only the consumers that are not locked-in. Firms cannot change prices for locked-in consumers -i.e., consumers with a contract. 12 Denote by , the 3 × 3 ownership matrix, formed according to the rule:
The profit function for firm f is given by:
where c j is the marginal cost of firm j , and the demand for product j is given by the product of the market share s j by the market size m, defined in the previous section.
The Nash equilibrium of the game is given by the first-order conditions: 13
Denote by • S t , the Hadamard, or element by element product of matrices and S t . System (6) can be written in matrix notation as:
Initially, there are three mobile telephony firms: Tmn, Vodafone, and Optimus. Each firm owns one of the mobile telephony products. Thus: =I. In the course of the analysis, we will assume two alternative forms for the matrix : (i) one associated with the merger of Tmn and Optimus, and (ii) one associated with joint profit maximization.
Econometric Implementation

The Data
We use quarterly data from Portugal for the period 1999:1 to 2005:4, obtained from the firms. For each firm and period, we have: the number of subscribers, Z jt ; the number subscribers with pre-paid cards; the number of subscribers with contracts; total revenues; the revenues from voice traffic; the voice traffic; the operating costs; the cost of materials; the cost of labor; and the number of employees. We also have the interest rate on ten-year Treasury bonds. We construct average prices, p jt , by dividing the total firm revenues from traffic by the total number of minutes of traffic.
Demand Estimates
We estimate two models consisting of three demand functions given by (3). 14 In Model I, only consumers with contracts are locked-in. In Model II, consumers with contracts and 50% of consumers with pre-paid cards are locked-in. Otherwise the models are identical. In particular, in both models the demand for mobile telephony subscription is a function of: (i) the average prices, (ii) the lagged penetration rate of mobile telephony, and (iii) firm-specific dummy variables. The price and network coefficients are common across the three demand functions. 13 Following the literature, we assume that: (i) firms play a Nash equilibrium, and (ii) a Nash equilibrium exists. See Anderson and de Palma (1992) for the proof of existence for the nested logit model with multiproduct firms assuming symmetry. This assumption is supported by the observed strategies of the firms. Typically, there are no drastic changes in the prices of mobile telephony, except when new entry occurs, or innovations are introduced, e.g., pre-paid cards. See Gagnepain and Pereira (2007) . In Spain and Ireland, the sectorial regulators tried to prove that there was collective dominance in mobile telephony. The French antitrust authority found incriminating paper evidence on market-sharing between the network operators. 14 The model was estimated using the SAS procedure PROC MODEL. The merger simulation was conducted in Matlab. Table 2 presents the estimation results for Model I. The model is estimated first using ordinary least squares, OLS. Reported R-squared is about 0.60 for each equation. The Breusch-Godfrey test rejects the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, and the White test rejects the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity in all three demand equations. In addition, the estimate of σ is larger than 1, but not statistically significant. To account for the problems of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity of the error term, and the problem of endogeneity of prices and the within-group shares, we estimate the model through the general method of moments, GMM, using the Newey and West (1987) consistent covariance matrix estimator. We use as instruments the weighted average across firms of the cost of materials per subscriber, the cost of labor per employee, and the number of workers per subscriber, as well as the interest rate of ten-year Treasury bonds, a time trend, and a dummy variable for the fourth quarter. 15 The GMM estimates of all parameters are statistically significant. The estimates of α and σ decrease considerably compared with the OLS estimates. In particular, σ is estimated to be 0.865, but statistically significantly different from 1. This implies that mobile telephony products are very close substitutes. Table 2 presents also the estimation results for Model II. The OLS estimates are presented merely as a reference. The GMM estimates are again all statistically significant. Compared to Model I, the estimate of α increases, and the estimates of σ and Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations of the price elasticities of demand for the time period of this study based on GMM estimates. The second, third, and fourth columns give the own-and cross-price elasticities of demand for the mobile telephony products. The last column gives the elasticities of the market demand of mobile telephony with respect to the prices of the mobile telephony products and the lagged penetration rate. For Model I, the own-price elasticities of demand are high and range from −2.59 for Tmn to −6.41 for Optimus. A 1% increase in the price of Optimus decreases its sales by 6.41% and increases the sales of Tmn and Vodafone by 1.36% each. The values in the last column of Table 3 are interpreted as follows. A 1% increase in the price of Optimus decreases the number of subscribers of mobile telephony by 0.06%. This is the outcome of two opposing effects: a decrease in the number of subscribers of Optimus, and an increase in the number of subscribers of Tmn and Vodafone. A similar interpretation holds for Tmn and Vodafone. If all firms increase simultaneously their prices by 1%, the number of subscribers of mobile telephony decreases by the sum of these values, which is 0.32%. If the lagged penetration rate increases by 1%, the number of subscribers increases by 0.98%.
Price Elasticities of Demand
The estimates of the own-and cross-price elasticities of demand for the mobile telephony products are larger for Model I than for Model II. However, the elasticities of the market demand of mobile telephony subscription with respect to the prices of the mobile telephony products and the lagged penetration rate are larger for Model II than for Model I. 16
Merger Analysis
The merger of Tmn and Optimus would result in a market with two mobile telephony firms: (i) one controlling the two products previously owned by Tmn and Optimus, to which we shall refer as Tmn−Optimus, and (ii) Vodafone, which would maintain its product. The merger consists of a change from matrix to matrix m , given by:
We use the demand estimates in Table 3 and equation (7) to compute the marginal costs, which are presented in Table 4 . 17 Then, given these estimates, and replacing with m , we solve system (7) with respect to prices to estimate the price of each product after the merger. Table 4 presents the estimated prices after the merger for Models I and II under three scenarios: (i) there are no cost efficiencies, (ii) there is 5% reduction in the costs of Tmn and Optimus, and (iii) there is 10% reduction in the costs of Tmn and Optimus. 18 For Model I, after the merger, the weighted average prices of mobile telephony increase on average by 7%. The largest increase, 13%, occurs for Optimus, and the lowest, 3%, occurs for Vodafone. 19 If the merger generates a 10% reduction in the costs of the merging firms, on average, prices increase by 6%. 20 The estimates of the price elasticities are smaller for Model II than for Model I. Therefore, the price increases are larger for Model II than for Model I. For Model II, after the merger, the prices of mobile telephony increase on average by 10%.
In the second case, we assumed that 50% of the consumers with pre-paid cards are locked-in to the same network operator. Contrary to consumers with contract they can benefit quickly from price decreases, which is ignored in the first-order conditions Footnote 16 continued higher own and cross-price price elasticities of demand for the mobile telephony products, but a lower price elasticity for the market demand for mobiles. 17 Given the estimates of the demand model, one can compute matrix S t . The prices and the market shares are observed. Thus, assuming matrix is singular, one knows all the variables on the left-hand side of equation (7), except the marginal costs given by vector c. One can solve for marginal costs by a simple matrix inversion, i.e.; c = ( • S t ) −1 s + p. By definition, the market shares are different in Model I and Model II, which results in different estimates of marginal costs presented in Table 4 . 18 We follow the literature in considering a 5% and a 10% marginal cost reduction. Optimus did produce some estimates of the synergies that the merger would create. However, Optimus was unable to distinguish between marginal and fixed cost reductions, and most of the claimed cost reductions seemed to refer to fixed costs. 19 These simulations ignore adjustments in the consumption levels -i.e., in the number of calls and minutes, resulting from price changes. However, the price elasticities of the demands for calls and duration are very small. 20 One could also consider the case in which after the merger, the less efficient Optimus is able to provide services with the marginal cost level of Tmn. This case is, however, unlikely, since the merger is hostile and is conducted by Optimus. Besides, it generates implausible results. The price of Optimus decreases by 10% and the price of Tmn increases by 40%. The price of Vodafone remains almost unchanged. This occurs because the post-merger margins are equal for both firms, but the pre-merger margins differ significantly. Marginal costs are computed using equation (7) and assuming post-merger cost efficiencies. Markups are computed for pre-merger prices and post-merger marginal costs. Differences in marginal costs between Model I and Model II are due to differences in the definition of market shares. Mean prices are weighted by pre-and post-merger market shares respectively
given by the system of equations (7). We tried to include in the profit function the gains on this share of consumers. Unfortunately, the estimates of marginal costs based on the modified version of equation (7) turned out to be positive only for Optimus, negative for Tmn, and almost zero for Vodafone. Given prices, the estimates of the marginal costs increase when the size of the group of locked-in consumers decreases. Thus, firms have higher margins if there is a large group of locked-in consumers. For positive estimates of the marginal costs and assuming that 50% consumers with prepaid cards are locked-in, we should observe higher prices. We used the estimates of marginal costs from Model II, given in Table 4 , to simulate the post-merger prices when firms take also into account the presence of locked-in consumers. For these marginal costs, the computed average pre-and post-merger prices are higher by about 36-40% −0.54, 0.69] than in the case where locked-in consumers are ignored. However, the increase in post-merger prices is roughly at the same level of about 8%. Table 5 reports the impact of the merger on profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare, with 95% confidence intervals. 21 For Model I, on average, after the merger the consumer surplus decreases by 2.1%. The profits of all firms increase, where the average increase in profits equals 26%. Social welfare remains unchanged. However, the confidence intervals for changes in profits, consumer surplus, and welfare are large and include both positive and negative values. For Model II, the decrease in consumer surplus is larger.
We use the information on the revenues and the operating costs of the firms to asses the plausibility of the assumption that firms play a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. 22 More specifically, we compare the estimated price-cost margins,
To compute the confidence intervals, we used the covariance matrix of the parameter estimates to generate 1,000 draws from a joint-normal distribution. For each draw, we computed the pre-merger and post-merger prices, which we then used to compute the percentage change, relative to the pre-merger situation, of the post-merger profits, the consumer surplus, and the social welfare. This way we obtained a distribution of potential changes. For some draws of the parameter values, the model produced unrealistically high prices. We filtered out these values using we following criterion. We considered as unrealistic prices higher than 1, where the average value of our pre-merger prices is 0.24. Out of 1, 000 draws, we filtered out about 20 price observations. When the post-merger prices were very high -i.e., close to 1 -the model produced high pre-merger prices. Thus, the changes in the profits, the consumer surplus, and the social welfare should not be strongly affected. 22 This approach is used in some recent studies, e.g., Genesove and Mullin (1998) , Pinkse and Slade (2004) , Röller and Steen (2006) . With estimates of the marginal cost one could test directly the plausibility of the non-cooperative Nash assumption by comparing the estimated and the observed margins. We made several attempts to estimate cost functions. However, the lack of quality data prevented us from estimating useful results. , where rev jt is the total revenue and opc jt is the accounting operating cost, respectively, of firm j in period t. Table 6 presents simple statistics on estimated and observed margins. Unfortunately, there are large differences between these values. This could be due to the definition of operating costs, which are accounting costs, rather than economic marginal costs. In particular, the observed margins of Optimus are negative. The observed margins of Tmn are much higher than those of Vodafone.
We also estimated the marginal costs under the assumption that firms maximized jointly their profits. In this case matrix consists only of ones. The estimates of all the marginal costs are negative. Recall that the mobile telephony products are very close substitutes. We take this as evidence that firms do not collude on prices.
Conclusion
In this article we simulated the unilateral effects of a merger in the Portuguese mobile telephony market. We estimated the price elasticities of demand using a nested logit model and quarterly data from 1999:1 to 2005:4. The mobile telephony products seem to be close substitutes. Using the estimates of the price elasticities of demand and the assumption that firms play a static Bertrand game we estimated the marginal costs. We used the estimates of price elasticities of demand and the marginal costs to simulate the unilateral effects of a merger between Tmn and Optimus. We found that the merger can lead to substantial price increases even with cost efficiencies.
In mobile telephony, the complexity of the consumers' behavior and the firms' strategies is very challenging for economic modelling. However, we had only limited aggregate data, which constrained the sophistication of our analysis. In addition, competition authorities or sectorial regulators usually have limited resources, such as time and personnel, to collect data and evaluate the merger effects. This is a compelling argument for using simple methods.
The merger in mobile telephony in Portugal is a natural experiment that can be used to assess whether standard analysis of this type may provide us with accurate predictions with respect to unilateral effects.
